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Abstract
In many realistic problems of allocating resources,
economy efficiency must be taken into considera-
tion together with social equality, and price rigidi-
ties are often made according to some economic
and social needs. We study the computational is-
sues of dynamic mechanisms for selling multiple
indivisible items under price rigidities. We pro-
pose a polynomial algorithm that can be used to
find over-demanded sets of items, and then intro-
duce a dynamic mechanism with rationing to dis-
cover constrained Walrasian equilibria under price
rigidities in polynomial time. We also address the
computation of sellers’ expected profits and items’
expected prices, and discuss strategical issues in the
sense of expected profits.
1 Introduction
Problem of allocating resources among selfish agents has
been a well-established research theme in economics and re-
cently becomes an emerging research topic in AI because
AI methodologies can provide computational techniques
[Rothkopf et al., 1998; Sandholm, 2002; Zhang et al., 2010]
to the balancing of computation tractability and economic (or
societal) needs in these problems.
Dynamic mechanisms for resource allocation are trad-
ing mechanisms for discovering market-clearing prices
and equilibrium allocations based on price adjustment
processes [Ausubel, 2006; Gul and Stacchetti, 2000;
Zhang et al., 2010] Assume a seller wishes to sell a set
of indivisible items to a number of buyers. The seller
announces the current prices of the items and the buyers
respond by reporting the set of items they wish to buy at the
given prices. The seller then calculates the over-demanded
set of items and increases the prices of over-demanded items.
This iterative process continues until all the selling items can
be sold at the prices at which each buyer is assigned with
items that maximize her personal net benefit.
Different from one-shot combinatorial
auctions[Cramton et al., 2006], the main issue of a dy-
namic mechanism is whether the procedure can lead to an
equilibrium state (Walrasian equilibrium) at which all the
selling items are effectively allocated to the buyers (equilib-
rium allocation) and the price of items gives the buyers their
best values [Gul and Stacchetti, 1999; Kelso et al., 1982;
Lehmann et al., 2006; Sun and Yang, 2009].
Most of the discussions on the issues of dynamic mecha-
nisms are based on market models in which there does not
exist price rigidities. In fact, “good” allocations must look
after both sides economy efficiency and social equality, and
price rigidities may play a key role in some of these problems.
For instance, in an estate bubble period, housing cost is un-
bearable for most of the members of society. The government
may need to allocate some housing resources (whose prices
are not completely flexible but restricted under some price
rigidities) to middle-income earners. On one hand, the lower
bound prices can be made according to some basic economic
requirements (e.g., construction costs); on the other hand, the
upper bound prices 1 should be made according to some re-
alistic social foundation (e.g., average income level or pay
ability). It is well-known that a Walarasian equilibrium exists
in the economy when there are no price rigidities. In the case
of price restrictions, a Walrasian equilibrium may not exist
since the equilibrium price vector may not be admissible.
Talman and Yang studied the equilibrium allocation
of heterogeneous indivisible items under price rigidities,
and proposed the concept of constrained Walrasian equi-
libria [Talman and Yang, 2008]. A constrained Walrasian
equilibrium consists of a price vector p, a rationing
system R, and a (constrained) equilibrium allocation pi
[Lehmann et al., 2006] s.t. p obeys the price rigidities, and pi
assigns each buyer an item (permitted by R) that maximizes
her personal net benefit at p. They also proposed two dynamic
auction procedures that produce constrained Walrasian equi-
libria. However, the computational issues of these procedures
have not been touched.
In this paper, we present a polynomial algorithm that can
be used to find over-demanded sets of items, and then intro-
duce a dynamic mechanism(called MAPR) with rationing to
discover constrained Walrasian equilibria under price rigidi-
ties in polynomial time. In MAPR, buyers compete with each
other (with the help of the seller) on prices of items for mul-
1Note that since upper bound prices are often set for the sake of
equality between social members (who have some but limited pay
ability), they generally accompany a limit to the number of resources
one member can get.
tiple rounds. In each round, the seller announces the cur-
rent price vector (initially, the lower bound price vector) of
the items that remain, then the buyers respond by reporting
the set of resources they wish to buy, then the seller com-
putes a minimal over-demanded set Xmin of the items. If
Xmin = ∅ then the final allocation is computed by the RM
subroutine and MAPR stops. Otherwise if all the prices of the
items in Xmin are less than their upper bounds then the seller
increases them; else an item a ∈ Xmin (whose price is on
its upper bound) is picked and the buyers who only demand
some items (including a) in Xmin draw lots for the right to
buy a. Since MAPR’s execution process is nondeterministic,
we define the concepts of buyers’ expected profits and items’
expected prices, and consider strategical issues (in the sense
of expected profit) in MAPR.
Here are main contributions of our work:
• We address the computational problems of dynamic auc-
tion proposed by [Talman and Yang, 2008], where these
problems have not been touched.
• [Talman and Yang, 2008] has not finished the proof
about the existence of constrained Walrasian equilib-
rium. We propose an algorithm to get the final alloca-
tion and several lemmas to prove the criteria required in
constrained Walrasian equilibrium.
• We defined the “expected profits” and “expected prices”
and discuss strategical issues.
This paper is structured as follows. First, we re-
view some basic notions that are relevant to our work
(see [Talman and Yang, 2008] for further details and exam-
ples). Second, we represent demand situations with bipar-
tite graphs. Third, we address the computation of minimal
over–demanded sets of items. Fourth, we present MAPR, and
prove formally that it yields a constrained Walrasian equilib-
rium in polynomial time. Fifth, we consider strategical issues
in MAPR. Finally, we draw some conclusions.
2 Preliminaries
Consider a market situation where a seller wishes to sell a
finite set X of indivisible items to a finite number of buyers
N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The item o ∈ X is a dummy item which
can be assigned to more than one buyer. Items (eg., houses or
apartments) in X \ {o} may be heterogeneous.
A price vector p ∈ ZX+ assigns a non-negative integer to
each a ∈ X and p
a
is the price of a under p. It is required
that p
a
is not completely flexible and restricted to an interval
[p
a
, p
a
] s.t. p
a
, p
a
∈ Z+, p
a
≤ p
a
, and 0 = p
o
= p
o
.
We say p and p as the lower and upper bound price vectors.
P = {p ∈ ZX+ |(∀a ∈ X)pa ≤ pa ≤ pa} is called the
set of admissible price vectors. Each i ∈ N has an integer
value function, i.e., ui : X → Z+. ui(a) is i’s valuation
to item a. We assume ui is i’s private information, ui(o) =
0, and i can pay maxa∈X pa units of money. We say E =
〈N,X, {ui}i∈N〉 is an economy.
A rationing system is a function R : N × X → {0, 1}
s.t. R(i, o) = 1 for every i ∈ N . R(i, a) = 1 means that
buyer i is allowed to demand item a, while R(i, a) = 0
means that i is not allowed to demand a. At p ∈ P and
Table 1: Values, Indirect Utilities, and Constrained Demand
buyer i ui(o) ui(a) ui(b) ui(c) ui(d) Vi(p, R) Di(p, R)
1 0 4 3 5 7 0 {o,d}
2 0 7 6 8 3 4 {c}
3 0 5 5 8 7 1 {b}
4 0 9 4 3 2 4 {a}
5 0 6 2 4 10 3 {d}
rationing system R, the indirect utility Vi(p, R) and con-
strained demand Di(p, R) of buyer i is given by: Vi(p, R) =
max{ui(a) − pa|a ∈ X and R(i, a) = 1}, and Di(p, R) =
{a ∈ X |R(i, a) = 1 and ui(a) − pa = Vi(p, R)}. An allo-
cation of X is a function pi : N → X s.t. pi(i) 6= pi(j) if
j 6= i and pi(i) ∈ X \ {o}. pi is an equilibrium allocation if
pi(i) ∈ Di(p, R) for all i ∈ N .
〈p, R, pi〉 is a constrained Walrasian equilibrium if (1) p ∈
P , R is a rationing system, (2) pi is an equilibrium allocation,
(3) p
a
= p
a
if pi(i) 6= a for all i ∈ N , (4) p
a
= p
a
and
pi(i) = a for some i ∈ N if R(j, a) = 0 for some j ∈ N , and
(5) a ∈ Di(p, R′) if R(i, a) = 0, where R′(j, b) = R(j, b)
for all 〈j, b〉 ∈ N ×X except R′(i, a) = 1.
Conditions (1) and (2) need no explanation. Condition (3)
says that if the price of a item is greater than its lower bound
then it must be assigned to some buyer. (4) states that if an
buyer is not allowed to demand some items then the item must
be assigned to another buyer at its upper bound price. Con-
dition (5) says that if an buyer is allowed to demand a item
which she was not allowed to demand, then she will demand
the item. To sum up, constrained Walrasian equilibrium is a
equilibrium state under price rigidities. All the five conditions
make a balance between efficiency and equality.
The following example is modified from the one given
in [Talman and Yang, 2008]. It illustrates the notions intro-
duced in this section and will be used throughout the paper.
Example 1 Let E = 〈N,X, {ui}i∈N 〉 be an economy such that
N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, X = {o, a, b, c, d}, and buyers’ values are
given in Table 1; price vector p = (0, 5, 4, 4, 7); and pi be an allo-
cation of X such that pi(1) = o, pi(2) = c, pi(3) = b, pi(4) = a,
and pi(5) = d. Suppose the lower and upper bound price vec-
tors are p = (0, 5, 4, 1, 5), and p = (0, 6, 6, 4, 7), respectively.
So p is an admissible price vector. Let R be a rationing sys-
tem such that R(i, x) = 1 for all 〈i, x〉 ∈ N × X except that
R(3, c) = R(1, c) = 0. For each buyer i ∈ N , Vi(p, R) and
Di(p, R) are also shown in Table 1. Obviously, 〈p, R, pi〉 is a con-
strained Walrasian equilibrium.
3 Demand Situation and Maximum
Consistent Allocation
Given an economy E = 〈N,X, {ui}i∈N 〉, we call D =
(Di)i∈N a demand situation of E if there is a price vector p
and a rationing system R such that Di = Di(p, R) for all i ∈
N . An allocation pi is consistent withD if pi(i) ∈ Di∪{o} for
all i ∈ N . pi is maximum if |{i ∈ N |o 6∈ Di and pi(i) 6= o}|
≥ |{i ∈ N |o 6∈ Di and pi′(i) 6= o}| for every allocation pi′
consistent with D.
D can be represented as a bipartite graph BG(D) = 〈N ′ ∪
X ′, E〉 where N ′ = {i ∈ N |o 6∈ Di}, X ′ =
⋃
i∈N ′
Di, and
E = {{i, a}|i ∈ N ′, a ∈ Di}. A matching in BG(D) is a
subset M of E s.t. e ∩ e′ = ∅ for all e, e′ ∈ M with e 6= e′.
M is maximum if |M ′| ≤ |M | for each matching M ′.
It is not hard to see that a matching M in BG(D) deter-
mines an allocation consistent with D. piM denotes the allo-
cation determined by M , that is, piM (i) = a if ∃{i, a} ∈ M ,
and piM (i) = o otherwise. Suppose M is maximum, then
piM is maximum and it is easy to find that: there exists an
equilibrium allocation ⇔ |M | = |{i ∈ N |o 6∈ Di}| ⇔ piM is
an equilibrium allocation.
In fact, to find a maximum matching in a bipartite graph
is a pure combinatorial optimization problem, which can be
addressed in polynomial time. [Schrijver, 2004] presents the
matching augmenting algorithm MA, which takes a bipartite
graph G = 〈V , E〉 and a matching M in G as input, and out-
puts a matching MA(G,M) = M ′ s.t. |M ′| ≥ |M | and⋃
e∈M ′
e ⊇
⋃
e∈M
e in time O(|E|). So a maximum match-
ing can be found in time O(|V||E|) (as we do at most |V|
iterations), i.e., O(|N ||X |min(|N |, |X |)). In the following
discussion, MˆD denotes the maximum matching of BG(D)
found by this way.
Example 2 See the economy given in Example 1. Let price vector
p = (0, 5, 4, 3, 5) andR be the rationing system such thatR(i, a) =
1 for all 〈i, a〉 ∈ N × X . Then buyers’ constrained demands at p
and R are: D1(p, R) = {c, d}, D2(p, R) = D3(p, R) = {c},
D4(p, R) = {a}, D5(p, R) = {d}. Let D = (Di(p, R))i∈N . Then
MˆD = {{1, c}, {4, a}, {5, d}}.
4 Over-demanded Set of Items
What can lead to non-existence of equilibrium allocations?
This is a key issue that we need to consider.
Given a demand situationD = (Di)i∈N , a set of real items
X ′ ⊆ X \ {o} is over-demanded in D, if the number of buy-
ers who demand only items in X ′ is strictly greater than the
number of items in X ′, i.e., |{i ∈ N |Di ⊆ X ′}| > |X ′|; X ′
is not under-demanded, if the number of buyers who demand
some items in X ′ is not less than the number of items in X ′,
i.e., |{i ∈ N |Di ∩X ′ 6= ∅}| ≥ |X ′|. An over-demanded set
X ′ is minimal if no strict subset of X ′ is over-demanded. We
can get Lemma 1 directly based on these definitions.
Lemma 1 Let X ′ ⊆ X \ {o} is over-demanded. Then for
each a ∈ X ′, either there exists a minimal over-demanded
set X ′′ ⊆ X ′ s.t. a 6∈ X ′′, or a ∈ X ′′ for every minimal
over-demanded set X ′′ ⊆ X ′.
Theorem 1 answers the question proposed in the beginning
of this section.
Theorem 1 There exists an over-demanded set of items in
D = (Di)i∈N if and only if there does not exist an equi-
librium allocation.
PROOF. Sufficiency is obvious. Let us prove necessity. Suppose
there does not exist an equilibrium allocation. Let M = MˆD and
N ′ = {i ∈ N |o 6∈ Di}. Then |M | = |N ∩
⋃
e∈M e| < |N
′|.
Pick a buyer i from N ′ \ N ∩
⋃
e∈M e. We construct a sequence
〈X0, N0〉, 〈X1, N1〉, . . . as follow:
1. algorithm MODS(D = (Di)i∈N ,M = MˆD)
2. pick i from {i ∈ N |o 6∈ Di} \
⋃
e∈M e;
3. X ′′ := Di, X ′ := ∅;
4. while(X ′′ 6= ∅)
5. N ′ := {j ∈ N |(∃a ∈ X ′′){j, a} ∈M};
6. X ′ := X ′ ∪X ′′, X ′′ :=
⋃
j∈N′ Dj \X
′;
7. Xmin := ∅, X ′′ := X ′;
8. for all a ∈ X ′
9. X ′′ := X ′′ \ {a};
10. N ′ := {i ∈ N |Di ⊆ Xmin ∪X ′′};
11. D′ := (Di)i∈N′ , k := |MˆD′ |;
12. if k = |N ′|
13. Xmin := Xmin ∪ {a};
14. return Xmin;
Figure 1: MODS algorithm.
• X0 = Di, N0 = {j ∈ N |(∃a ∈ X0){j, a} ∈M};
• Xk+1 =
⋃
j∈Nk
Dj ; and Nk+1 = {j ∈ N |(∃a ∈
Xk+1){j, a} ∈M}.
Pick any k ≥ 0 and a ∈ Xk. Suppose there does not exist j ∈
N such that {j, a} ∈ M . Then there is an M -augmenting path
[Schrijver, 2004] from a to i, i.e., M is not maximum, contradicting
the fact that M is maximum. So for all k ≥ 0 and a ∈ Xk , there
exists j ∈ N such that {j, a} ∈M . Consequently,
1. Xk ⊆ Xk+1 ⊆ X , Nk ⊆ Nk+1 ⊆ N for all k ≥ 0;
2. if Xk+1 = Xk then Xk+l = Xk and Nk+l = Nk for all
k, l ≥ 0.
So there must exist K ≥ 0 s.t. X0 ⊂ . . . ⊂ XK = XK+1 = . . ..
For each b ∈ XK , b is assigned to only one buyer inNK at piM . And
for each j ∈ NK , Dj ⊆ XK and j is assigned with only one item
in XK at piM . So |XK | = |NK |. Consequently, |{i ∈ N |Di ⊆
XK}| ≥ |NK ∪ {i}| = |NK |+ 1 = |XK |+ 1 > |XK |. So XK is
an over-demanded set of items in D. 
To find a minimal over-demanded set of items, we develop
the MODS algorithm shown in Figure 1. Given a demand
situation D, and MˆD s.t. |MˆD| < |{i ∈ N |o 6∈ Di}|, MODS
returns a minimal over-demanded set of items Xmin. The
basic idea of MODS is to generate an over-demanded set
X ′ firstly (see lines 2-6 in Figure 1), and then (according to
Lemma 1) to find a minimal over-demanded set Xmin ⊆ X ′
(see lines 7-14 in Figure 1).
The correctness of algorithm MODS is directly from
Lemma 1 and the proof of Theorem 1. Let BG(D) = 〈V , E〉.
Observe MODS and we can find the following facts.
1. In order to generate an over-demanded set X ′ (lines 4-6
in Figure 1), MODS only visits edges in E . For each
e ∈ E , e can be visited once at most.
2. |X ′| ≤ |MˆD| ≤ min(|N |, |X |), and BG(D′) ⊆
BG(D) (see line 11).
According to |E| ≤ |N ||X |, and that the complexity of
MˆD is in O(|N ||X |min(|N |, |X |)), the overall complexity
of MODS(D, MˆD) is in O(|N ||X |(min(|N |, |X |))2).
Example 3 See D and MˆD described in Example 2. It is easy to
find that |MˆD| < |{i ∈ N |o 6∈ Di}|. We apply MODS algorithm
1. algorithm RM((Di)i∈N ,M, p, p)
2. X ′ := {a ∈ X \
⋃
e∈M e|pa > pa};
3. N ′ := {i ∈ N \
⋃
e∈M e|Di ∩X
′ 6= ∅};
4. D′ := (Di ∩X ′)i∈N′ , M ′ := MˆD′ ;
5. N∗ := N \
⋃
e∈M e, 〈V, E〉 := BG((Di)i∈N∗);
6. M ′′ := M ′ ∩ E ;
7. while(MA(〈V, E〉,M ′′) 6= M ′′)
8. M ′′ := MA(〈V, E〉,M ′′);
9. return M ′′ ∪ {e ∈M ′|e ∩
⋃
e′∈M′′ e
′ = ∅};
Figure 2: RM algorithm.
to (D, MˆD). Firstly, an over-demanded set X ′ = {c, d} is found.
And then a minimal over-demanded set Xmin = {c} is found.
5 Mechanism for Resource Allocation under
Price Rigidities
In this section, we present a polynomial mechanism for re-
source allocation under price rigidities (MAPR). Its basic
idea is to eliminate over-demanded sets of items by increas-
ing the prices of over-demanded items or rationing an over-
demanded item whose price has reached its upper bound.
MAPR
(1) The seller ϕ announces the set X of items to allocate,
and sets p0 := p,M0 := ∅, N ′ := N . Each buyer
i ∈ N sets Ri[a] := 1 for all a ∈ X . Let t := 0.
(2) ϕ sends pt and “Report your demand.” to each i ∈ N ′.
(3) Each i ∈ N ′ computes and sends Di2 to ϕ.
(4) ϕ computes N ′′ = {i ∈ N ′|Di ∩
⋃
e∈Mt
e 6= ∅}. If
N ′′ = ∅ then go to step (6). ϕ sends “Sorry, items in
D′
i
= Di ∩
⋃
e∈Mt
e have been sold. Please report your
new demand.” to each i ∈ N ′′, and sets N ′ := N ′′.
(5) Each i ∈ N ′ sets Ri[a] := 0 for all a ∈ D′i. Go to (3).
(6) Let N∗ = N \⋃
e∈Mt
e and D∗ = (Di)i∈N∗ . ϕ com-
putes MˆD∗ . If |MˆD∗ | = |{i ∈ N∗|o 6∈ Di}| then go to
step (9). ϕ computes Xmin = MODS(D∗, MˆD∗).
(7) ϕ computesX = {a ∈ Xmin|pta = pa}. If X = ∅ then:
ϕ sets N ′ := N∗, M t+1 := M t, pt+1
a
:= pt
a
+ 1 for all
a ∈ Xmin, and pt+1a := pta for all a ∈ X \Xmin. Let
t:=t+1. Go to (2).
(8) ϕ picks an item a from X and asks the buyers in {i ∈
N∗|a ∈ Di ⊆ Xmin} to draw lots for the right to buy
a. Let i be the winning buyer. ϕ sets M t+1 := M t ∪
{{i, a}}, N ′ := N∗ \ {i} and pt+1 := pt. Let t:=t+1.
Go to (2).
(9) ϕ computesM∗ := M t ∪RM((Di)i∈N ,M t, pt, p) and
then announces pt and piM∗ are the final price vector and
allocation. MAPR stops.
2Di = {a ∈ X|Ri[a] = 1 and ui(a) − pta = max{ui(b) −
ptb|Ri[b] = 1}}
[Talman and Yang, 2008]provides two dynamic proce-
dures that produce constrained Walrasian equilibrium. But
it does not address the computation issues, and the third con-
dition of constrained Walrasian equilibrium cannot be guar-
anteed either. In order to make sure that all the items whose
prices exceed their lower bound prices will be sold(the third
criterion of constrained Walrasian equilibrium), the RM sub-
routine shown in Figure 2 is called in step 9. Given a de-
mand situation D = (Di)i∈N , a partial matching M con-
sistent with D, the current price vector p, and the lower
bound price vector p, RM returns a matching M ′ such that
(1) piM∪M ′ is an equilibrium allocation, (2) M ∩M ′ = ∅,
and (3) {a ∈ X \⋃
e∈M
e|p
a
> p
a
} ⊆
⋃
e∈M ′
e.
Observe MAPR and RM subroutine. We can find that:
• computation of each step is polynomial in |N | and |X |;
• for each t ≥ 0, the number of the loops consisting of
steps 3-5 is not more than |X |; and
• the number of the loops consisting of steps 2-8 is not
more than
∑
a∈X
(p
a
− p
a
).
Consequently, MAPR always terminates and is polynomial in
|N |, |X |, and
∑
a∈X
(p
a
− p
a
).
In order to prove the correctness of MAPR and RM, we
will first give some definitions and provide three lemmas,
then we will prove that MAPR can lead to a constrained Wal-
rasian equilibrium with the help of these three lemmas. In
the following discussion, we suppose that MAPR terminates
at some time T ≥ 0; pt, M t, Rt (Rt(i, a) = Ri[a] for
all 〈i, a〉 ∈ N × X , where Ri is the vector kept by buyer
i at time t), and (Dt
i
)i∈N denote the price vector, partial
matching that has been made so far, rationing system, and
demand situation at time 0 ≤ t ≤ T , respectively. Let
Xt = {a ∈ X \
⋃
e∈Mt
e|pt
a
> p
a
} and N t = {i ∈
N \
⋃
e∈Mt
e|Dt
i
∩Xt 6= ∅}.
Now we introduce three auxiliary lemmas (in which D =
(Di)i∈N denotes a demand situation). These three lemmas
are closely connected. The proof of Lemma 4 is based on
Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, and the proof of Theorem 2 is
based on the these three lemmas. Lemma 2 states that, each
nonempty subset of a minimal over-demanded set of items is
not under-demanded.
Lemma 2 Let X ′ be a minimal over-demanded set of items.
Then for each ∅ ⊂ X ′′ ⊆ X ′, |{i ∈ N |Di ∩ X ′′ 6=
∅ and Di ⊆ X ′}| > |X ′′|.
The proof of Lemma 2 is not very hard, and comes from using
the reduction to absurdity.
Lemma 3 states that, the cardinality of a maximum match-
ing is not less than the cardinality of a set of real items if each
subset of the set is not under-demanded.
Lemma 3 Let X ′ ⊆ X \{o} and |{i ∈ N |Di∩X ′′ 6= ∅}| ≥
|X ′′| for each X ′′ ⊆ X ′. If M is a maximum matching of
BG((Di \ {o})i∈N ), then |M | ≥ |X ′|.
The proof of Lemma 3 is similar to that of Theorem 1. Due
to lack of space, it is omitted.
Lemma 4 states that, all the items in Xt can be sold. The
proof of Lemma 4 is based on Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
Lemma 4 Let Dt = (Dt
i
∩ Xt)i∈Nt . Then |MˆDt | = |Xt|
for each 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
PROOF. We first prove that |{i ∈ N t|Dti ∩ X ′ 6= ∅}| ≥ |X ′| for
each ∅ ⊂ X ′ ⊆ Xt and 0 ≤ t ≤ T :
1. It holds at t = 0 because X0 = ∅.
2. Suppose MAPR does not stop at tˆ ≥ 0 and |{i ∈ N t|Dti ∩
X ′ 6= ∅}| ≥ |X ′| for each ∅ ⊂ X ′ ⊆ Xt and 0 ≤ t ≤ tˆ.
3. ThenXmin 6= ∅ andX are computed at time tˆ and steps 6-7 of
MAPR. Pick any ∅ ⊂ X ′ ⊆ X tˆ+1. Let N1 = {i ∈ N tˆ|Dtˆi ⊆
Xmin and Dtˆi ∩ X ′ 6= ∅} and N2 = {i ∈ N tˆ|Dtˆi ∩ (X ′ \
Xmin) 6= ∅}. There are two possibilities:
Case I : X = ∅. So X tˆ+1 = X tˆ∪Xmin . According to Lemma
2 and item 2, we have |N1| > |X ′ ∩Xmin| and |N2| ≥
|X ′ \ Xmin|. It is easy to find that Dtˆ+1i ∩ X
′ 6= ∅
for each i ∈ N1 ∪ N2 ⊆ N tˆ+1 and N1 ∩ N2 = ∅.
So |{i ∈ N tˆ+1|Dtˆ+1i ∩ X
′ 6= ∅}| ≥ |N1 ∪ N2| =
|N1|+ |N2| > |X
′ ∩Xmin|+ |X
′ \Xmin| = |X
′|.
Case II : X 6= ∅ and some a ∈ X is assigned to some buyer j
such that a ∈ Dtˆj ⊆ Xmin . So X tˆ+1 = X tˆ \ {a}. Ac-
cording to Lemma 2 and item 2, we have |N1| > |X ′ ∩
Xmin| and |N2| ≥ |X ′ \ Xmin|. It is easy to find that
Dtˆ+1i ∩X
′ 6= ∅ for each i ∈ (N1 \ {j}) ∪N2 ⊆ N tˆ+1
and N1 ∩ N2 = ∅. Consequently, |{i ∈ N tˆ+1|Dtˆ+1i ∩
X ′ 6= ∅}| ≥ |(N1 \ {j}) ∪ N2| ≥ |N1| − 1 + |N2| ≥
|X ′ ∩Xmin|+ |X
′ \Xmin| = |X
′|.
Consequently, |{i ∈ N tˆ+1|Dtˆ+1i ∩X ′ 6= ∅}| ≥ |X ′|.
According to items 1–3, |{i ∈ N t|Dti ∩X ′ 6= ∅}| ≥ |X ′| for each
X ′ ⊆ Xt and 0 ≤ t ≤ T . It is easy to find that |MˆDt | ≤ |Xt| for
each 0 ≤ t ≤ T . According to Lemma 3, we have |MˆDt | ≥ |Xt|
for each 0 ≤ t ≤ T . So |MˆDt | = |Xt| for each 0 ≤ t ≤ T . 
Now we are ready to establish the following correctness
theorem for MAPR (and RM subroutine).
Theorem 2 〈pT , RT , piMT 〉 found by MAPR, is a con-
strained Walrasian equilibrium.
PROOF. (Sketch) 〈pT , RT , piMT 〉 is a constrained Walrasian equi-
librium iff it satisfies the five conditions shown in page 2.
1. It is easy to find that conditions (1), (4), and (5) are satisfied
by 〈pT , RT , piM
T
〉.
2. For each buyer i and the item assigned to her a = piM
T
(i),
there are two possibilities: Case I (step (8)), i is the winner of
a lottery on item a at some time T ′ ≤ T , and Case II (step (6)
and (9)), a is assigned to i at time T .
(a) In case I, a ∈ Di(pT ′ , RT ′). So ui(a) − pT ′a ≥
ui(b)−pT
′
b for all b ∈ {b ∈ X|RT
′
(i, b) = 1}. Because
RT
′
(i, a) = RT (i, a) = 1, pT
′
a = p
T
a , R
T ′(i, b) ≥
RT (i, b) and pT
′
b ≤ p
T
b for all b ∈ X , ui(a) − pTa ≥
ui(b) − pTb for all b ∈ {b ∈ X|RT (i, b) = 1}. So
a ∈ Di(pT , RT ).
(b) In case II, according to the definition of piMT (see RM
subroutine and steps (6)–(9)), we have a ∈ Di(pT , RT ).
Consequently, piM
T
is an equilibrium allocation.
3. According to Lemma 4, all the items in XT are sold. Conse-
quently, pTa = pa for each a ∈ {b ∈ X|(∀i ∈ N)pi
MT (i) 6=
b}. The correctness of RM subroutine can derive from item 2
and item 3 directly.
So 〈pT , RT , piM
T
〉 is a constrained Walrasian equilibrium. 
Example 4 See Example 1. Apply MAPR to 〈E, p, p〉. The de-
mands, price vectors, rationing system and other relevant data gen-
erated by MAPR are illustrated in Table 2, where Ui, Di, X ′,
N ′, and Xmin denote {a ∈ X|Rt(i, a) = 0}, Di(pt, Rt),
X ∩
⋃
e∈Mt e, N ∩
⋃
e∈Mt e, and the value of Xmin computed
by the seller at step (6) and time t.
At t = 3, the price of c has reached its upper bound 4. The
seller assigns randomly c to buyer 2 or buyer 3. So there are two
different possible histories of resource allocation from t = 3. Along
the history of t = 4.1; 5.1; 6.1, MAPR finds 〈p6.1, R6.1, piM6.1〉,
where piM
6.1
(1) = o, piM
6.1
(2) = c, piM
6.1
(3) = b, piM
6.1
(4) =
a, and piM6.1(5) = d. Along the history of t = 4.2; 5.2; 6.2, MAPR
finds 〈p6.2, R6.2, piM6.2〉, where piM6.2(1) = o, piM6.2(2) = b,
piM
6.2
(3) = c, piM
6.2
(4) = a, and piM
6.2
(5) = d.
6 Expected profits, Expected Prices, and
Strategical Issues
Since the history of MAPR is nondeterministic, we need to
introduce concepts of buyers’ expected profits and items’ ex-
pected prices. Let Rt∗ be a rationing system s.t. Rt∗(i, a) = 1
if {i, a} ∈M t or a 6∈
⋃
e∈Mt
e, and 0 otherwise. Because we
can induce M t from Rt∗. So M t can be written as MR
t
∗
. We
say 〈pt, Rt∗〉 is an allocation situation. Assume that the com-
putation of MODS algorithm and the selection of items in
step (8) are deterministic, all the lots happening in MAPR are
fair 3. Then buyer i’s expected profit and item a’s expected
price on 〈p, R〉 (i.e., u∗
i
(p, R) and p∗
a
(p, R)) are:
u∗i (p, R) =


Vi(p, R) if Xmin = ∅
u∗i (p′, R) if X = ∅∑
i′∈N′
u∗
i
(p,R
i′
)
|N′|
otherwise
p∗a(p, R) =


pa if Xmin = ∅
p∗a(p
′, R) if X = ∅
∑
i′∈N′
p∗
a
(p,R
i′
)
|N′|
otherwise
where (let D = (Di(p, R))i∈N ):
• Xmin = ∅ if |MˆD | = |{i ∈ N |o 6∈ Di(p, R)}|, and
MODS(D, MˆD) otherwise; X = {a ∈ Xmin|pa = pa};
• p′a = pa for all a 6∈ Xmin and p′a = pa+1 for all a ∈ Xmin;
• b ∈ X is the item selected by the seller in step (8);
• N ′ = {i ∈ N |b ∈ Di(p, R) ⊆ Xmin};
• for all 〈i, a〉 ∈ N × X: Ri′(i, a) = R(i, a) if a 6= b;
Ri′(i, b) = 0 if i 6= i′; and Ri′(i′, b) = 1.
In fact, u∗
i
(p, R) and p∗
a
(p, R) can be computed by develop-
ing a search tree: each node is an allocation situation, and is
expanded (if Xmin 6= ∅) into (i) one single branch if X = ∅,
3Suppose there are k buyers drawing lots for the right to buy item
a. Then the lot is fair if each one of these buyers has 1/k chance of
winning the lot.
Table 2: Data Generated by MAPR
t pto p
t
a p
t
b p
t
c p
t
d Xmin U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 N
′ D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 X
′
0 0 5 4 1 5 {c} ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ {c} {c} {c} {a} {d} ∅
1 0 5 4 2 5 {c} ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ {c} {c} {c} {a} {d} ∅
2 0 5 4 3 5 {c} ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ {c, d} {c} {c} {a} {d} ∅
3 0 5 4 4 5 {c} ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ {d} {c} {c} {a} {d} ∅
4.1 0 5 4 4 5 {d} ∅ ∅ {c} ∅ ∅ {2} {d} {d} {a} {d} {c}
5.1 0 5 4 4 6 {d} {c} ∅ {c} ∅ ∅ {2} {d} {b, d} {a} {d} {c}
6.1 0 5 4 4 7 ∅ {c} ∅ {c} ∅ ∅ {2} {o, d} {b} {a} {d} {c}
4.2 0 5 4 4 5 {d} ∅ {c} ∅ ∅ ∅ {3} {d} {a, b} {a} {d} {c}
5.2 0 5 4 4 6 {d} {c} {c} ∅ ∅ ∅ {3} {d} {a, b} {a} {d} {c}
6.2 0 5 4 4 7 ∅ {c} {c} ∅ ∅ ∅ {3} {o, d} {a, b} {a} {d} {c}
and (ii) |N ′| branches otherwise. See Table 1 and Table 2.
We can find that u∗1(p0, R0∗) = 0.5 ∗ u∗1(p6.1, R6.1∗ ) + 0.5 ∗
u∗1(p6.2, R6.2∗ ) = 0, u∗3(p0, R0∗) = 0.5∗u∗3(p6.1, R6.1∗ )+0.5∗
u∗3(p6.2, R6.2∗ ) = 2.5, p∗a(p0, R0∗) = 0.5 ∗ p∗a(p6.1, R6.1∗ ) +
0.5 ∗ p∗
a
(p6.2, R6.2∗ ) = 5.
As most collective decision mechanisms, MAPR is gener-
ally not strategyproof (in the sense of expected profit). For
instance, see Example 4. If buyer 1 reports her demands sin-
cerely, then her expected profit is 0. However, if 1 knows
other buyers’ valuations and reports strategically, then she re-
ports {c} from t = 0 to t = 3 (i.e., as if her valuation to item
c is not less than 7), then reports sincerely, then her expected
profit changes to 1/3, which makes her better off.
Now we are interested in two questions: (1) is MAPR strat-
egyproof for some restricted domains? (2) when it is not, how
hard is it for an buyer who knows the valuations of the others
to compute an optimal strategy?
First we define reporting strategies and manipulation prob-
lems formally. Without loss of generality, let 1 be the manip-
ulator. Note that not every sequence of 1’s demands is rea-
sonable. For instance, see Example 4 and Table 2. The seller
can detect 1’s manipulation if 1 reports {c}, {c}, {c, d}, and
{c} at t = 0, 1, 2, and 3, respectively, because there is no
value function u s.t. u(c) − p2
c
= u(c) − 3 = u(d) − 5 =
u(d)− p2
d
= u(d)− p3
d
< u(c)− p3
c
= u(c)− 4. A strategy
for buyer 1 is a value function u : X → Z+ with u(o) = 0.
So 1 can safely manipulate the process of MAPR when she
reports her demands according to u completely (as if u is her
true value function). A manipulation problem M (for buyer
1) is a 5-tuple 〈N,X, {ui}i∈N , p, p〉 where 〈N,X, {ui}i∈N 〉
is an economy, p and p are the lower and upper bound price
vectors on X , respectively. A strategy for M is optimal if 1
can not strictly increase her expected profit by reporting her
demands according to any other strategy.
Now, back to question (1): we show that the answer is pos-
itive when there are two buyers.
Theorem 3 Let M = 〈N,X, {ui}i∈N , p, p〉 be a manipula-
tion problem s.t. N = {1, 2}. Then u1 is optimal for M .
PROOF. Suppose that if 1 reports sincerely, then her expected
profit is ∆. Let D1 and D2 be 1 and 2’s true demands at p and R
respectively, where R(i, a) = 1 for each i ∈ N and a ∈ X .
Obviously, if D1 ∪D2 = {o} or |D1 ∪D2| ≥ 2 (i.e., Xmin = ∅
at t = 0) then ∆ = maxa∈X(u1(a)−p
a
), which is the best possible
outcome for 1. So u1 is optimal in these cases.
Now, suppose D1 = D2 = {a} s.t. a 6= o. Pick any strategy u′.
Let k = pa − pa, ki = ui(a) − pa − maxb∈X\{a}(ui(b) − pb),
bi ∈ X \ {a} s.t. ui(bi) − p
bi
= ui(a) − p
a
− ki, and kˆ =
min(k, k1 − 1, k2 − 1). Then if 1 applies strategy u1, then she will
report D1 from t = 0 to t = kˆ and:
1. if kˆ = k, then ∆ = 0.5 ∗ (u1(a)− p
a
− k) + 0.5 ∗ (u1(b1)−
p
b1
)=u1(b1) − p
b1
+ 0.5 ∗ (k1 − k) > u1(b1) − p
b1
. If 1
applies u′ instead, then her expected profit will not be better
than u1(b1)−p
b1
< ∆ if u′(a)−p
a
−maxb∈X\{a}(u
′(b)−
p
b
) ≤ k, and will not be better than ∆ otherwise.
2. if k > kˆ = k1 − 1, then ∆ = u1(b1) − p
b1
. Because 2 can
insist on {a} to t = min(k, k2 − 1) ≥ k1 − 1, 1’s expected
profit can not be better than ∆.
3. if k > kˆ = k2−1, then ∆ = u1(a)−p
a
−k2 ≥ u1(a)−p
a
−
k1 = u1(b1)−p
b1
. Because 2 can insist on {a} to t = k2−1,
1’s expected profit can not be better than ∆.
To sum up, in all cases, 1 can not strictly increase her expected profit
by applying strategy u′. So u1 is optimal for M . 
For the cases where there are more than two buyers, we
conjecture that the manipulation problem is NP-hard, but we
could not find a proof.
7 Conclusion
We have presented a decentralized protocol for allocating
indivisible resources under price rigidities, and proved for-
mally that it can discover constrained Walrasian equilibria in
polynomial time. We also have studied the protocol from
the points of computation of buyers’ expected profits and
items’ expected prices, and discussed the manipulation (by
one buyer) problem in the sense of buyer’s expected profit.
There are several directions for future work. One direc-
tion would be to prove the conjecture about the complex-
ity of manipulation (in the sense of expected profits) by
one buyer. Another direction would be to study manipula-
tion (in the sense of expected prices) by one or more buy-
ers (whose manipulation motivation is not to buy some re-
sources but to put up the prices of some resources). Fur-
thermore, we plan to study the problems of allocating di-
visible resources [Brams et al., 2012] and sharable resources
[Airiau and Endriss, 2010] under prices rigidities.
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